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[Abstract] ​The rapid dynamics of COVID-19 calls for quick and effective tracking of virus              
transmission chains and early detection of outbreaks, especially in the “phase 2” of the              
pandemic, when lockdown and other restriction measures are progressively withdrawn, in order            
to avoid or minimize contagion resurgence. For this purpose, contact-tracing apps are being             
proposed for large scale adoption by many countries . A centralized approach, where data             1
sensed by the app are all sent to a nation-wide server, raises concerns about citizens’ privacy                
and needlessly strong digital surveillance, thus alerting us to the need to minimize personal data               
collection and avoiding location tracking.  
We advocate the conceptual advantage of a decentralized approach, where both contact and             
location data are collected exclusively in individual citizens’ “personal data stores”, to be shared              
separately and selectively (e.g., with a backend system, but possibly also with other citizens),              
1 ​https://www.top10vpn.com/news/surveillance/covid-19-digital-rights-tracker/  
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voluntarily, only when the citizen has tested positive for COVID-19, and with a privacy              
preserving level of granularity. This approach better protects the personal sphere of citizens and              
affords multiple benefits: it allows for detailed information gathering for infected people in a              
privacy-preserving fashion; and, in turn this enables both contact tracing, and, the early             
detection of outbreak hotspots on more finely-granulated geographic scale. The decentralized           
approach is also scalable to large populations, in that only the data of positive patients need be                 
handled at a central level. Our recommendation is two-fold. First to extend existing             
decentralized architectures with a light touch, in order to manage the collection of location data               
locally on the device, and allow the user to share spatio-temporal aggregates - if and when they                 
want and for specific aims - with health authorities, for instance. Second, we favour a               
longer-term pursuit of realizing a Personal Data Store vision, giving users the opportunity to              
contribute to collective good in the measure they want, enhancing self-awareness, and            
cultivating collective efforts for rebuilding society. 
 
[Introduction] National authorities are currently addressing the rapid spread of SARS-CoV-2           
through strong, sometimes extreme control measures aimed at containing and slowing the            
diffusion of the virus to levels that can be managed by health-care and socio-political              
institutions. Knowledge of where and when the diffusion is taking place is essential for              
shortening the emergency period, and for focusing stronger countermeasures where they are            
actually needed. The imposition of generalized and strong emergency measures limiting citizen            
liberty is, in part, an effect of our poor knowledge of how and where exactly the virus is                  
circulating and outbreaks are growing. Very recent results have clearly shown that immediate             2
tracing of infected people - ideally from the pre-symptomatic phase - could significantly             
contribute to reducing the individual’s infection rate (the well-known ​R​0​ index) below 1. 
Personal big data, able to describe the movement of people in greater detail, should be seen as                 
a potentially powerful weapon in combatting the pandemic, for example in contact tracing, that              
is, revealing the places a patient who has tested positive has visited in recent days (thus                
identifying places in risk of contagion) in addition to the people the user has been in contact with                  
(thus identifying specific people at risk). This kind of operation potentially puts individual privacy              
at risk, and is at the core of current debates about the best trade-off between privacy and data                  
value for public health. One example is South Korea, which made the movement of positive               
patients de facto public, clearly favouring data value (with excellent results in containment of              
virus spread) while sacrificing patient privacy (who risks a social stigma, potentially dissuading             
people from exposing and testing for the virus ). In contrast, various European efforts lean              3
toward strong individual personal data protection, stipulating clear requirements that data           
collection apps should satisfy and promoting a unified European approach . We believe it is              4 5
2 Ferretti, L., Wymant, C., Kendall, M., Zhao, L., Nurtay, A., Bonsall, D.G., and Fraser, C. (2020). 
Quantifying dynamics of SARS-CoV-2 transmission suggests that epidemic control is feasible through 
instantaneous digital contact tracing. ​Science​. 
https://science.sciencemag.org/content/early/2020/03/30/science.abb6936 
3 ​https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-00740-y  
4 ​https://www.ccc.de/en/updates/2020/contact-tracing-requirements  
5 ​https://www.politico.eu/article/coronavirus-europe-data-regulator-calls-for-pan-european-covid-19-app/  
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possible to reap the benefits of contact tracing, including location data with a privacy preserving               
level of granularity, without forgoing personal data protection altogether while enhancing trust.            
GDPR compliance, abiding to the principle of privacy/data protection by design and privacy/data             
protection by default, enables the benefits of location data. 
 
[Existing proposals & their limitations] Learning from current success stories as well as             
controversies, various teams of researchers and developers are now proposing a different            
vision where privacy protection is a ​must​, and solutions are designed to extract useful data               
without sharing personal sensitive information. In particular, the spatial information associated           
with the individual citizens (where they stay or move) is considered to be too sensitive, and                
difficult to protect. An important research direction is the privacy-safe, spatially-oblivious           
implementation ​proximity-tracing​, that in this context basically represents the ability to           
reconstruct the close contacts with other people that an individual had before being tested              
positive. A central example is the DP3T (Decentralized Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing )           6
approach. In general terms, the solution is based on mobile phone apps that continuously              
collect the list of anonymous, app-generated IDs of other phones (which, therefore, need to              
have the app installed, too) that had close and prolonged contacts with the device. With DP3T,                
the trusted authority simply broadcasts the anonymous app-generated IDs of the positive            
patient’s phone, and each contact needs to check the list to find themselves. DP3T is part of a                  
broader initiative, named PEPP-PT (Pan-European Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing ), that         7
covers various different approaches to the problem, like replacing the broadcasting phase with a              
different communication way where positive users provide the list of “contacted” anonymous            
app-generated IDs to the trusted central authority, who is then able to directly call and warn the                 
phones in the list. The strong point of this approach lies in the simplicity of the information used,                  
enabling an easy and rapid implementation that guarantees privacy protection. While we believe             
that this approach is on the right track and is particularly useful in the short term, we also                  
emphasize that limiting the analysis to simple contact (close-range proximity) data limits the             
efficacy. For example, the discoverability of potentially exposed contacts is by design limited to              
those who have the app installed, making it impactful only after a critical mass of users is                 
reached. Furthermore, only direct contacts are detected, thus not considering surface-touch           
contamination, which is a typical phenomenon in large shared spaces, like supermarkets and             
such, considered to be a potential vector of diffusion . Spatial information, joined with its              8
temporal dimension, is a key ingredient to detect outbreak hotspots. Spatial-temporal           
information within a privacy preserving architecture (e.g. appropriate granularity levels, clear           
access rights and aims for data processing, enhanced security, etc.) can provide vital granular              
aggregate data with a modest or null impact on fundamental rights and freedoms, see for               
example the MIT Private Kit Safe Path initiative . 9
6 ​https://github.com/DP-3T/documents  
7 ​https://www.pepp-pt.org/  
8 van Doremalen, N., ​et al​. (2020). Aerosol and surface stability of HCoV-19 (SARS-CoV-2) compared to 
SARS-CoV-1. ​The New England Journal of Medicine​. DOI: 10.1056/NEJMc2004973. 
9 Raskar, R., ​et al​. (2020). Apps gone rogue: Maintaining personal privacy in an epidemic. arXiv preprint 
arXiv:2003.08567 
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[Our proposal] Our claim is very simple: limiting data flow at its very source is not the best                  
answer. Individual citizens - and only them - should be able to collect detailed information about                
their own position and movement, together with other types of data, including (in the direction of                
previous proposals) pseudo-IDs of devices at close distance. The means for safeguarding            
privacy should instead be in ​providing the users with full control of such data​, together with                
the necessary tools for sharing only the information they want at the preferred level of detail, to                 
customise sharing of information depending on the individuals/entities with whom they are            
sharing, and for evaluating pros and cons of each sharing option.  
The paradigm we envision is based on a Personal Data Store , , where users collect and               10 11 12
manage all their own data, equipped with data management and analytics tools for elaborating              
them, as well as with functionalities for controlling what kind of information - raw or derived from                 
data - should be shared with other users or with authorities. The main points of the approach we                  
envision, based on such environment, are the following: 
● Each user has a ​personal software environment (either directly on the smart phone or              
in the cloud) where they can store, elaborate and control their own data in an exclusive                
way. No third-party has access to this data. 
● The personal software environment of the user is ​a tool they can actively decide to               
use to perform actions​, for instance to help in providing correct information to health              
authorities in case they are tested positive to COVID-19; or simply to contribute to public               
safety by joining some collective computation of global statistics useful to improve            
countermeasures.  
● When the user decides to share information, they define the ​aggregates to share​,             
taking into consideration the minimum spatial and temporal granularity of the information            
needed to realize the service. The environment provides the functionalities to define the             
minimum data requirement and to compute and share the data. A key point is that               
deciding the best trade-off between privacy and data utility might require a knowledge             
that is available only late in the process, because the context might change either the               
utility of a given type of data or the priorities of the individual. Interestingly, note that                
recent research has found that over 75% of individuals who reported being positive for              
COVID-19 had been in close contact with another individual - who they knew - infected               
by COVID-19 . 13
● The information sharing can happen in two modalities: 
○ A ​simple transfer to a trusted authority of the minimum data needed to realize              
the service, for instance the list of close contacts (e.g. as hashed mac-addresses             
10 Giannotti, F., Pedreschi, D., Pentland, A., Lukowicz, P., Kossmann, D., Crowley J., and Helbing, D. A 
planetary nervous system for social mining and collective awareness. (2012). Eur. Phys. J. Spec. Top. 
214, 49–75. ​https://doi.org/10.1140/epjst/e2012-01688-9  
11 de Montjoye, Y.-A., Shmueli, E., Wang, S.S., and Pentland, A. (2014). PloS one 9 (7), e98790. 
https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article/file?type=printable&id=10.1371/journal.pone.0098790 
12https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/study-personal-data-stores-conducted-cambridge-uni
versity-judge-business-school  
13 Oliver, N, Barber, X., Roomp, K. and Roomp, K., (2020), “The Covid19Impact Survey: Assessing the 
Pulse of the COVID-19 Pandemic in Spain via 24 questions”, arXiv.org, https://arxiv.org/abs/2004.01014 
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that only the contact herself can recognize) similar to PEPP-PT and DP3T; or the              
list of locations visited, in the form of Points of Interest or municipalities, useful to               
find potential outbreaks hotspots. 
○ When possible, through a collaborative, ​distributed computation of global         
aggregates involving the information of the user, e.g. using secure multi-party           
computation techniques  or specific privacy-preserving distributed methods . 14 15
● The information provided by authorities (possibly thanks to the individual contributions)           
about risky areas and possible contacts with positive patients can be joined with the              
complete information the user has about themselves, providing a data analytics-enabled           
self-awareness of own behaviour and the potential points of risk. For instance, the user              
might not realize that their own daily home-work routine involves passing through an             
area that has an increased level of risk, and the analysis might suggest modifying the               
route to work. Note that such level of detailed information would only be available locally               
to the specific user, as it comes from “merging” global information provided by             
centralised entities (e.g., a nation-wide authority) with local information available only to            
the individual user (on her/his devices). 
 
This proposal (like the PEPP-PT initiative) exemplifies a distinctively European approach of            
aiming to co-realize important moral obligations - in this case for public health and saving lives,                
together with respecting rights and fundamental freedoms - instead of choosing for a quick              
solution that relativizes one of our conflicting obligations. 
 
Maintaining the trust of citizens at a time of crisis like the current one is a priority. This includes                   
respecting the requirements for maintaining fundamental respect for human rights, ethical           
principles and existing legislation. A user-centric approach will also ensure that data is only              
used during the duration of the crisis and that the user has the control to end the tracking once                   
the need is over. Our proposal leverages both the respect for individual freedoms and for the                
environment, by cultivating feelings of solidarity and a sense of collective responsibility for             
rebuilding society. 
 
[Recommendations] Summarizing, our view is that emergency situations like the COVID-19           
pandemic represent a strong case - yet one not unique - where providing people complete               
control of the data they produce and collect and how they are shared (and, maybe, an improved                 
awareness of what they are collecting) can provide an edge in facing complex challenges.              
Initiating (centralized or decentralized) data collection with rigid predefined privacy and data            
quality requirements and excluding the human from the decision loop can often be suboptimal. 
 
14 Lindell, Y., and Pinkas, B.. (2008). Secure Multiparty Computation for Privacy-Preserving Data Mining. 
IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive. 2008. 197. 10.29012/jpc.v1i1.566. 
15 Achieving Privacy-preserving Distributed Statistical Computation. PhD thesis, 2012. 
https://www.research.manchester.ac.uk/portal/en/theses/achieving-privacypreserving-distributed-statistica
l-computation(6831db5c-d605-4a38-9711-7592d2b94e01).html  
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Our main recommendation, therefore, is to work on two parallel tracks: in the short-term and in                
the long-term. In the short term, the decentralized architectures currently under development for             
social contact tracing (in particular, PEPP-PT/D3PT) should be extended to manage the            
collection of location data locally on the device. A loose integration between the two              
components (contact and location data) should be provided, that keeps them logically            
independent and mutually not linkable. This allows us to maintain all the privacy-by-design             
benefits of the contact tracing solutions mentioned above, but the moment users are confirmed              
as a positive case, it allows them to voluntarily provide additional contextual information in a               
privacy-preserving way (on top of independently triggering the PEPP-PT/ D3PT contact tracing            
mechanisms), that can contribute to the computation of useful global aggregates , such as             16
spatio-temporal density maps  to identify potential infection hubs through location data. 17
 
Over a longer-term, deep-impact actions should be investigated to realize a Personal Data             
Store approach, to enable more effective emergency countermeasures based on a novel            
connection between collective good and the huge information treasure that each individual            
brings with themselves. 
16 ​https://ec.europa.eu/info/files/recommendation-apps-contact-tracing_en​ (e.g. point 1.2, page 8) 
17Anna Monreale, Wendy Hui Wang, Francesca Pratesi, Salvatore Rinzivillo, Dino Pedreschi, Gennady L. 
Andrienko, Natalia V. Andrienko: Privacy-Preserving Distributed Movement Data Aggregation. AGILE 
Conf. 2013: 225-245 
6 
